How Sergey Kirienko Is Battling the Siloviki

Sergey Kiriyenko has served for more than nine years as the first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration (PA), overseeing Russia’s domestic policy. He is one of Putin’s closest and most influential confidants. However, since the start of the war, the established system has begun to show signs of strain.

Kiriyenko is not in control of the situation with “foreign agents”

“Kiriyenko wanted to talk. I knew Seryozha and always had a good attitude toward him. I thought, well, fine, I’ll go, we’ll talk. Maybe he’ll give me some advice,” Alla Pugacheva recalled her meeting with the first deputy head of the PA in September 2022. The attack on anti-war artists was already in full swing, and her husband, Maxim Galkin, also fell victim to it after his posts on social media: advertisements featuring him were taken off the air, and his Russian concerts were cancelled.

According to Pugacheva, Kiriyenko asked her whether she was planning to leave the country. On his desk were files about Galkin: “What did he say, how did he express himself?” “I looked here, it’s understandable, it was emotional, he’s such a sensitive person, he’s an artist after all. So I don’t see any reason for you to be worried,” Pugacheva recounted the official’s words.

Two days after this meeting, Galkin was recognized as a “foreign agent.”

It would seem that the overseer of domestic policy should control one of its main instruments of repression — the “foreign agents” registry. In 2016, Putin had tasked Kiriyenko with monitoring the implementation of the relevant law. But several sources working in the Kremlin told IStories they believe Kiriyenko may not be aware of the Justice Ministry’s plans. According to one official responsible for domestic policy in a Russian region, foreign agents are outside his sphere of influence.

The tool, originally intended to discredit the opposition, now has a life of its own. People far removed from politics and activism are now being labeled “foreign agents” — for example, owners of major businesses, as well as pro-government Z-bloggers. In September, for instance, the popular pro-war blogger Roman Alekhin, who praises Kiriyenko’s work on his Telegram channel, was added to the registry.

In 2021, one official close to the Presidential Administration also found himself, along with other deputies and political consultants, on a list of potential foreign agents drawn up by Roskomnadzor. He hasn’t yet been labeled a foreign agent, “but everyone was fucking shocked,” an IStories source recalled.

Kiriyenko Doesn't Protect His Appointees from Arrest

Kiriyenko is one of the most influential people in government. His area of responsibility includes elections at all levels, as well as the preparation of a personnel reserve through a variety of contests and programs he created, such as the 'School of Governors' and 'Leaders of Russia.' According to official data from this spring, at least 600 graduates of the latter have received appointments: some have become governors, deputy federal ministers, and city heads.

Meanwhile, since the start of the full-scale war, the number of arrests of officials has grown almost threefold. In 2025, 155 officials were arrested, including sitting mayors and vice governors. Kirienko is not always even warned about these arrests, according to sources close to the Kremlin. The security forces “act autonomously” — there is no need to coordinate decisions with the government leadership or the internal policy bloc of the Presidential Administration, explains a source in United Russia.

“The logic of the security officers is that they need to show: during wartime, they are protecting the country from corruption and all sorts of bad actors who are getting in the way of Russia’s victory,” political scientist and visiting fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, Mikhail Komin, explains. But political patronage, on the contrary, has begun to falter, wrote political scientist Tatiana Stanovaya: officials have become “abandoned executors who can be swapped out like gloves, and no one will shed a tear.”

A current FSB employee told IStories that since the start of the full-scale war, it has become much harder to get authorization for wiretaps in non-political criminal cases, “all the equipment was redirected to wiretapping the government and other authorities.”

“There is a systemic battle underway for any resources,” explains a source working inside the Kremlin. “Because there are clearly far fewer of them now.” Since the full-scale war began, security forces have seized assets worth more than 4.5 trillion rubles (approximately $55.75 billion) under lawsuits brought by the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Even people from Kiriyenko’s own inner circle have come under attack.

In 2024, the FSB arrested retired colonel Mikhail Polyakov. Before 2022, he led one of the divisions in the Directorate for the Protection of the Constitutional Order at the Moscow and Moscow Oblast office of the FSB, according to a source cited by IStories. At the time of his detention, Polyakov, according to Kommersant, was working as a deputy director of security for the World Youth Festival Directorate, an autonomous non-profit organisation chaired by Kiriyenko.

With Kiriyenko’s approval, Polyakov oversaw pro-government Telegram channels, according to a source with IStories who is close to the security services: mass media have mentioned Nezygar, Kremlin Laundry, and BRIEF. Polyakov was arrested for allegedly demanding tens of millions of rubles from the major Russian IT company Lanit for a “block on negativity” — a guarantee not to publish negative posts about the company.

However, according to a source with IStories familiar with the details of the criminal case, Polyakov and some of his FSB colleagues, who also moved to the Presidential Administration, had a much wider remit. According to this source, FSB officers at Kiriyenko’s direction had “all but built their own intelligence service inside the Presidential Administration” with serious technical capabilities. When, at one point, the Administration’s controlled channels began publishing paid stories — including attacks on current FSB personnel — the “office” saw this as a betrayal of the service’s interests. After that, ‘they started working on Polyakov’s team,’ the IStories source says.

As part of the same case, FSB officers also detained and questioned Kristina Potupchik, the curator of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, who, according to IStories’ sources, was saved from criminal prosecution only by the intervention of high-ranking patrons.

The activity of the security forces has become a problem for the Presidential Administration, even after the arrest of the street musicians StopTime, a source close to the Kremlin says. Many social media users are convinced that the musicians were arrested for performing “foreign agent” songs that greatly alarmed the PA. The source close to the Kremlin clarifies that the decision was made without approval from the administration itself.

“No one knows what to do with them. No one wants to take responsibility or make a decision, because these are kids, and people are very unhappy with this situation,” he says.

Kiriyenko Can't Find Any "Heroes"

After the full-scale war began, the Leaders of Russia were joined by Time of Heroes, a programme designed to promote combatants. The famous technocrats faded into the background. The idea for the programme officially belongs to Putin and, according to sources interviewed by IStories, is very important to the president. Kiriyenko was tasked with implementing it.

Among those who have already been appointed are:

• Artem Zhoga, plenipotentiary representative in the Ural Federal District and former commander of the Sparta battalion, is accused of torturing Ukrainian prisoners of war in Donbas.
• Yevgeny Pervyshov, governor of the Tambov region, served in the BARS Cascade unit.
• Nursultan Mussagaleev, suspected of involvement in the killings of civilians in Bucha, became head of a district in the Orenburg Oblast.
• Maria Kostyuk, head of the Time of Heroes programme, became governor of the Jewish Autonomous Region, although she herself did not serve — her son died in the war.

Regional authorities launched their own versions of the Time of Heroes program, with the Kremlin calling on governors to recruit new personnel from among combatants of the full-scale war. This proved to be a challenge.

Bashkortostan took first place in the country in the number of applications received, more than 2,000. “There was an order to employ 40 people in municipal leadership, not as heads, but as deputies and department chiefs. We sifted through all these Time of Heroes applicants. Found two. With great difficulty,” says a Kremlin official, describing the situation in Bashkortostan. There are no official results from the program yet — finalists are currently in training.

The same problem arose in the selection of candidates for the State Duma in 2026. Initially, it was assumed that no less than 150 seats (a third of the Duma) would go to alumni of the Time of Heroes program, says a senior official in one of the Duma factions, but “it quickly became clear that these guys are not at all like the Young Guard or the other ‘Leaders of Russia’ types”: “You can’t deploy former combatants like that, they’re completely unsystematic, only a handful are capable of adequate work in the public sector.” The number began to shrink: “In the State Duma, as far as I know, these 150 turned into 100, then 70, and now they’re talking about 50,” adds another Kremlin official.

“We used to grumble about the technocrats, but as it turns out, that was not the worst option,” a Duma official admits.

Kiriyenko Fights for a ‘New Kadyrov’

Amid rumours about Ramzan Kadyrov's illness, a struggle for his successor's position has unfolded. And here, Kirienko's position is not strong enough.

Reports of serious health problems for the head of Chechnya began appearing in the media in early 2023. Novaya Gazeta Europe reported about pancreatic necrosis, while Bild reported kidney problems. The BBC Russian Service, citing a “member of the Chechen government,” reported that Kadyrov had a “serious illness.” The rumors were fueled by the Chechen leader’s appearance — he had gained significant weight; by his numerous vacations; and by his absence from major Kremlin events. Meanwhile, Putin met with one of Kadyrov’s sons, Adam.

Ramzan Kadyrov would indeed like to see his son Adam as his successor, according to a current FSB officer. The Presidential Administration has its own candidate, he says, a fact confirmed by a source who previously worked in the security services and specialized in the North Caucasus — that candidate is Apti Alaudinov, commander of the “Akhmat” unit, a “civilized Chechen enforcer.” In its investigation, Novaya Gazeta Europe concluded that, judging by his public appearances, Alaudinov is the Presidential Administration’s candidate in the event of a forced change at the top in Chechnya.

The FSB, however, has another candidate for the role of Chechnya’s leader, according to a former intelligence officer — none other than Kadyrov’s closest ally, Adam Delimkhanov. Kiriyenko does not have the clout to install his own man as the head of Chechnya — this post has a special position in Russian politics, explains Mikhail Komin. And Putin has not yet decided on the succession. “Tensions are rising both in Chechnya and in the FSB,” the former FSB officer concludes.

The conflict between Kiriyenko and the FSB has other roots as well, sources in the security services told IStories. “Kiriyenko is Kovalchuk’s man, who is considered the second most influential person in the country after Putin,” explains the former FSB officer, a claim confirmed by his current colleague. “Other clan leaders — especially those in the security agencies — see Kovalchuk as a rival in the power struggle. The longer the war drags on and the more it affects the Russian economy, the sharper the contradictions between the clans become.”

‘There Are No Rules Anymore’

Kiriyenko's influence is not limitless, Mikhail Komin sums up. “He is not some octopus that has wrapped itself around Russia and controls it instead of Vladimir Putin. In Russia’s political system, the actors are arranged more evenly and intricately. Kiriyenko is a major player, but not the only one,” Komin explains. These are different agencies, different groups, each responsible, in Putin’s eyes, for various matters, Komin adds.

According to IStories’ sources, all of these situations are symptoms of growing chaos in the corridors of power: decision-making has become far less institutionalized.

“Gradually, we’re reaching a point where there are no rules. It doesn’t matter — good or bad,” says a Kremlin insider. “Everyone understands: on one hand, there are no boundaries, you can do whatever you want, and on the other, no one is protected and no amount of proper behavior or good connections guarantees anything. For anyone. Absolutely anyone.”

“Everyone’s become a patriot, and all political decisions are now made in that logic,” is how a State Duma lawmaker succinctly describes the Kremlin’s new reality. The goal now is “to rack up points inside the system, not outside it,” adds a former Kremlin official. “This breeds ever more voluntarism and political deviations,” the source concludes.

Nonetheless, “the system has proved surprisingly resilient,” believes a former official close to the Presidential Administration: “And it has enormous inertia, so for another ten years or so you could keep distilling this cloudy moonshine on the old yeast. It doesn’t break, it just gets more rotten.”