Putin and the Bomb: History of Russian Nuclear Blackmail

“The plan was crystal clear: [Russia] would have cut through Ukraine like a knife through butter, reaching the border of Poland and the Baltic states, and then it would have pulled out its nuclear arsenal and repeated what he [Vladimir Putin] himself had said: ‘Yes, I understand that you are stronger than me in conventional terms. But here’s the thing: <...> I either annex the city of Narva, which is actually Russian [Narva is situated in Estonia - Ed.], or, if you resist, I’ll destroy a European city or an American military contingent,” — political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky described Putin’s plans had there been a swift victory over Ukraine.

All the leading Russian propagandists have threatened the West with a nuclear strike — this comes as no surprise anymore. For example, back in 2014 Dmitry Kiselyov [a famous Russian TV propagandist — Ed.] said that Russia could turn the U.S. into radioactive ash. And Margarita Simonyan [RT editor in chief — Ed.] said in 2025: “There are no guarantees other than a nuclear bomb.” 

Vladimir Solovyov [another well-known TV propagandist — Ed.] has, on various occasions, threatened Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. with nuclear weapons and even suggested setting off a nuclear explosion in space: “I don’t understand why, for example, Elon Musk’s satellites aren’t a legitimate target for us. One nuclear explosion in space, I believe, would solve this problem quite effectively.” There are also other examples.

But the propagandists won’t be the ones making the decision. It is Putin who has moved from discussing “getting rid of extensive weapons” to being ready to “employ all available means.” We describe his transformation in his own words.

Putin’s statements

Hereinafter, we use the Kremlin’s official translation.

March 2000. “We seek to make our world safer, to clean it of the stockpiles of weapons, of excessive weapons. <...> We should preserve and strengthen the Russian nuclear weapons capability. But this is not to say that we will increase its size, it is already excessive in some ways. We are talking about enhancing the security of the country and strengthening the nuclear “shield” of the Russian Federation.”

May 2002. “It’s more worthwhile perhaps to eliminate a certain part of nuclear potentials. <...> Any man who has at least once in his career dealt with arms, had arms in his hands, at least to hunt or a rifle or whatever, he knows that it's much better, much safer to have it in storage disarmed, disassembled perhaps, rather than to have it in your arms and charged with bullets in it and with your finger on the trigger at the same time.”

December 2014. “I think [sometimes — Ed.] that maybe it would be best if our bear just sat still. Maybe he should stop chasing pigs and boars around the taiga but start picking berries and eating honey. Maybe then he will be left alone. But no, he won’t be! Because someone will always try to chain him up. As soon as he’s chained they will tear out his teeth and claws. In this analogy, I am referring to the power of nuclear deterrence. As soon as — God forbid — it happens and they no longer need the bear, the taiga will be taken over.”

March 2015. In a film produced to commemorate the first anniversary of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Putin answered whether Russian nuclear forces had been placed on alert during the crisis: “We were ready to do it. I talked with [the Western counterparts — Ed.] colleagues and told them that this [Crimean peninsula — Ed.] is our historic territory, Russian people live there, they are in danger, we cannot leave them <...> ‘Where are you? Thousands of kilometers away. And we’re here. This is our land. What are you going to fight for here? You don’t know? We do. And we’re ready.’”

March 2018. “If someone decides to destroy Russia, then we have a legal right to respond. Yes, for humanity it will be a global catastrophe, for the world it will be a global catastrophe. But still, as a citizen of Russia and the head of the Russian state, then I want to ask myself the question: ‘Why do we need such a world if there is no Russia there?’”

October 2018. “We cannot be the initiators of such a catastrophe because we have no provision for a pre-emptive strike. Yes, it looks like we are sitting on our hands and waiting until someone uses nuclear weapons against us. Well, yes, this is what it is. But then any aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable and they will be annihilated. And we as the victims of an aggression, we as martyrs would go to paradise [Heaven — Ed.] while they will simply perish because they won’t even have time to repent their sins.”

February 2022. “No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history. No matter how the events unfold, we are ready. All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken.”

September 2022. “To defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff. The citizens of Russia can rest assured that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be defended — I repeat — by all the systems available to us. Those who are using nuclear blackmail against us should know that the wind rose can turn around.”

December 2022. “Concerning the threat of nuclear war. <...> The threat is growing, to be honest. Regarding Russia never using [nuclear weapons] first under any circumstances. Well, if it does not use them first, then it will not be the second to use them either, because in the case of a nuclear strike at our territory, our capabilities will be significantly limited.”

June 2024. “Somehow, the West believes that Russia will never use nuclear weapons. However, our nuclear doctrine clearly states that if somebody’s actions threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we reserve the right to employ all available means in response.”

Nuclear doctrine transformation

As Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric on nuclear weapons has grown more heated, Russia’s nuclear doctrine has also transformed.

The first doctrine (2000) was approved by Putin immediately after he won the 2000 presidential election. The document was published (which hadn’t happened in Soviet and Russian history) on April 21. In the document, the Russian Federation reserved the right to use nuclear weapons “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation” (English translation can be found here).

The second doctrine (2010) clarified the criteria for when nuclear weapons could be used by Russia. In the document, the circumstances allowing a nuclear strike were not described as “situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation” anymore, but instead a situation “when the very existence of the state is under threat” (source: Carnegie Endowment English translation). 

The third doctrine (2020). Essentially, we could consider the 2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” decree a new nuclear doctrine. The criteria for nuclear weapons usage had not changed, but the four conditions determining whether it can be used were described for the first time:

“arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies”; 

“use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies”; 

“attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions”; 

“aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” (source: official English translation)

For the first time, Russia has listed the risks “that can evolve into military threats to the Russian Federation and that are intended to be neutralized by the implementation of nuclear deterrence.” These include, among others, buildup by a potential adversary of forces groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories contiguous to the Russian Federation and its allies; deployment of missile defence systems, medium- and shorter-range missiles and strike unmanned aerial vehicles; deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.

The fourth doctrine (2024). The current nuclear doctrine (in English) was approved on November 19, 2024. Compared to the 2020 version, several changes have been made, including the provision specifying the circumstances under which Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons. Whereas previously an enemy attack using conventional weapons had to pose a threat to the very existence of the state, the doctrine now refers to a critical threat to the sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity of the state: furthermore, the doctrine now covers attacks not only on Russia but also on Belarus, where Russia has deployed nuclear weapons (“as participants in the Union State” — Ed.)

Another condition for the usage of nuclear weapons added to the four mentioned above is “receipt of reliable data on the massive launch of air and space attack means” (aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc) and their crossing of the state border of Russia. 

The list of military risks that can potentially evolve into threats has also been expanded. In light of the Ukrainian military’s promises to isolate Crimea, this point seems to be the most relevant right now: “actions by a potential adversary aimed at isolating a part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vital transport communication.”

Are Russian nuclear threats a bluff or not?

From a rational point of view, using nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine makes little sense. IStories have described why (here and here). In short, there are now no large concentrations of troops or equipment on the frontlines due to the usage of drones, so a tactical nuclear strike would not achieve any military objectives. An attempt to alter the course of the war with a strategic nuclear strike to shock the enemy and force them to surrender could result in the simultaneous death of tens of thousands (or even hundreds of thousands) of civilians. Russia probably won’t take such a step. But even a tactical nuclear weapons use would turn pretty much the entire world against Russia.

Neither Ukraine nor its Western allies have ever crossed the line beyond which Russia would seriously consider using nuclear weapons, says Maxim Starchak, Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy of the Queen’s University (Canada): “Throughout this war, the parties have firsthand seen the limits of nuclear deterrence. Russia likely believed that its nuclear capabilities would deter the West in providing Ukraine with certain types of weapons. But that didn’t work out. On the one hand, the West has taken the nuclear factor into account in its actions. This affected the timing of delivery and the types of weapons supplied. On the other hand, it turned out that by gradually supplying the required weapons the West is not moving toward a nuclear conflict with Russia.”

Rather than exposing Russia’s bluff, the goal of Ukraine’s allies is to ensure that the nuclear weapons usage framework (the one that Russia established itself) keeps working, explains Pavel Podvig, the head of the “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces” research project. Back in 2022, not only the Western countries, but also China, India, and the Global South countries expressed their sharp opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, the G20 2022 summit declaration stated that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable.

Ukraine’s allies must continue intensifying the pressure on Russia, which means emphasizing that nuclear threats and the use of nuclear weapons are unacceptable, and that no one is posing a threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Podvig believes. According to him, this pressure allows the West to ramp up the arms shipments and enables Ukraine to intensify the strikes against Russian territory: “The idea is to establish a framework and operate within its limits. And I see no reason why this would not keep working. If nuclear weapons are completely removed from this equation, the support for Ukraine could be even more intensive. The aid to Ukraine and the arms delivery have been successful for as long as the nuclear weapons have been removed from this framework.”