Why Vladimir Putin Launched Oreshnik Missile

Two stages of escalation

The first stage of the current military-political escalation began with Putin’s statement on September 12th, 2024. If Western governments, he said, allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory with their long-range weapons, this “will mean that NATO countries, the US, and European countries are at war with Russia... We will make appropriate decisions based on the threats that will be created for us.” In his opinion, Armed Forces of Ukraine’s officers are unable to independently input flight missions into American and British missiles, and can only receive target coordinates from Western allies. Less than two weeks later, on September 25th, Putin announced changes to the “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” expanding the list of conditions under which Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons.”

However, the signing of the decree approving the updated nuclear doctrine was postponed, which contradicted established procedure. Usually, after a public announcement of the discussion of such documents at the highest level, they are approved either on the same day or the next. This delay could have been a signal — as long as Washington prohibits Kyiv from using ATACMS against internationally recognized Russian territory, Moscow will refrain from enacting the new nuclear doctrine. But perhaps Moscow was waiting for the results of the US presidential elections. The potential victory of Kamala Harris, presumably, was perceived in the Kremlin with relative calm: the Democrats’ characteristic combination of belligerent rhetoric with minimal aid to Ukraine did not cause serious concern there.

The second stage of escalation began shortly after the results of the US presidential elections were determined. The reason for this was given by Joe Biden, who on November 16th authorized Ukraine to use missiles with a range of up to 300 km against Russian territory. Kyiv took advantage of this authorization: on the nights of November 19th and 21st, ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles struck military targets in the Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts. The Kremlin seems to have expected this. Immediately after the first strike, on November 19th, Putin signed a decree approving the new nuclear doctrine, and after the second, he announced the use of a medium-range missile against the Ukrainian missile factory Yuzhmash in Dnipro. In the following days, he talked a lot and rather inane about new Russian wonder weapons, against which, according to him, no one has any defense. The media once again started talking about the world being on the brink of nuclear war in Europe.

What Moscow fears and wants

Moscow explains its actions by stating that the permission to use American ATACMS and Franco-British Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles has changed the nature of the conflict and signifies the direct involvement of Western states in the war in Ukraine. The question immediately arises: what exactly has changed? The US has been providing Ukraine with target coordinates within Russian territory and occupied areas throughout the war: Ukraine does not have space-based assets that allow it to do this with the necessary accuracy. Ukraine has regularly used drones to strike targets deep within Russian territory, up to 2,000 km away, based on these coordinates. American ATACMS and Franco-British Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles have been used against targets in the occupied regions of Ukraine, which Moscow considers its territory, as enshrined in its Constitution. All of this was perceived in the Kremlin with relative calm: all is fair in war.

Moscow’s reaction cannot be explained solely by military circumstances. ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP can hit Russian targets within a relatively narrow strip no more than 300 km wide from the border with Ukraine or the line of contact. The number of such missiles that Ukraine possesses or may possess in the future is small, a maximum of 100-200 units. Considering that several missiles are required to reliably destroy a well-protected target, neither ATACMS nor Storm Shadow can have a serious impact on the course of the war.

Most likely, Putin used Biden’s authorization for the sole purpose of demonstrating to the world that he has a new medium-range missile and that he is ready to use it if Ukraine and the West do not comply with his demands. And the reason for this is the potential Republican victory, which could lead to major and unfavorable consequences for Russia, which Putin intends to prevent by threatening a missile-nuclear crisis in Europe.

In particular, the plan being developed within Donald Trump’s entourage to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, the outlines of which are gradually becoming clearer, does not suit the Kremlin in any way. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov made this clear in an interview with Tucker Carlson. He reiterated Putin’s words that Russia is ready “to conduct negotiations based on the principles that were agreed upon in Istanbul,” which fundamentally contradicts the approach of Donald Trump and his team on several points. For example, Trump’s plan provides for a ceasefire, followed by the start of negotiations, strengthening Ukraine’s military security, and possibly creating a demilitarized zone with the deployment of troops from European states. Moscow, on the contrary, demands Kyiv’s agreement to its conditions first, and only then a ceasefire, strict restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces, and a categorical ban on any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory.

If the elected US president insists on his plan, does not accept the ultimatums presented by Moscow to America and NATO in December 2021, and does not meet Putin halfway on a wide range of international issues, an acute crisis in Europe is inevitable, distracting Trump for a long time from his goal, which he considers the main one: confrontation with China. “The message they wanted to convey by testing this hypersonic system in real conditions,” stated Lavrov, for example, in an interview with Tucker Carlson, “is that we will be ready to do everything to protect our legitimate interests… But Russia’s security interests were completely ignored.” Western countries, Lavrov continued, rejected Russian proposals, drafts of which were presented to the West in December 2021.

Oreshnik, also known as Rubezh

The question naturally arises: does Russia have the resources to impose its conditions on Washington? In particular, what is the notorious Oreshnik? Apparently, this is a slightly modernized version of the missile developed in Russia in the 2010s under the name Rubezh. This version was put forward by the US Department of Defense. Something is known about Rubezh. This is a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with one stage removed and, accordingly, its range reduced by about half, lying within the range of two to five thousand kilometers. The payload of Rubezh, that is, the weight of the warheads, is, according to some sources, 800 kg, according to others — 1200 kg. Rubezh, also known as Oreshnik, like any medium-range missile with a throw-weight of one to two tons, is designed to deliver nuclear weapons. Using a missile costing tens of millions of dollars to deliver a ton of non-nuclear explosives to a target is the height of absurdity. It is equally pointless to use Oreshnik against Ukraine: Russia has many other, much cheaper means of hitting Ukrainian civilian and military targets.

Actually, Putin did not hide the fact that the targets for Oreshnik are actually located in Europe. “The development of medium- and shorter-range missiles is being carried out by us as a retaliatory measure to US plans to produce and deploy medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region… Today, the US is not only producing such equipment, but has also worked out the issues of transferring its advanced missile systems to various regions of the world, including Europe.” It seems that by demonstrating readiness for a limited nuclear war in Europe, Putin is threatening to unleash a new military-political crisis there, similar to the one that took place in the 1970s and 1980s.

Crisis of the 1970s–1980s

In the mid-1970s, the USSR began deploying missiles, known in the West as SS-20s, with a range of about 5,000 km. These were weapons designed for a limited nuclear war in Europe, allowing Moscow to deprive NATO countries of their ability to resist with a single strike. A strike with a hundred or two nuclear warheads on European countries would present the US with an existential choice: either accept that Europe would be defenseless against a Soviet invasion, or respond with its strategic weapons against targets on Soviet territory. The latter meant turning a limited nuclear war into a total one and the destruction of both the USSR and the USA. Moscow expected that Washington would not risk its own destruction in order to avenge the defeat of its allies. Similar fears, naturally, existed in European countries. In other words, the very appearance of the SS-20 called into question the basis of NATO’s security — the reliability of American nuclear guarantees to Europe. The latter was the most important goal of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.

The West’s response proved to be quite effective: American Pershing ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles began to be deployed in Europe. High-precision Pershings with a flight time of 10–15 minutes could destroy the headquarters of the Soviet political leadership and key command centers, leaving the Kremlin no time to decide on a retaliatory strike. In a broader context, the West gained the ability, during a nuclear war limited to the geographical framework of the European continent, to inflict heavy damage on the Soviet Union and present Moscow with the same choice it had tried to present to America: either accept defeat in a limited war and preserve the country, or respond to the US and perish along with it. As a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to capitulate and agree to the elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

Moscow’s miscalculation

These days, Putin seems to be making the same mistake as the Soviet leadership in the 1970s–1980s: by demonstrating the Oreshnik, he is threatening the West with a limited nuclear war in Europe, believing that it will not be able to withstand the pressure of force. Moscow’s attempt to blackmail the West by deploying SS-20s failed because the authors of this idea underestimated the determination of the US and Europe to respond to force with force. The extent to which the current leaders of the Western world are ready to repeat the experience of their predecessors — Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, who understood that blackmailers can only be dealt with by opposing them with force and a willingness to use it — is still unclear. But several circumstances inspire a certain optimism.

NATO member state leaders have shed their naive illusions about Russia. The latter, stated in the declaration of the Washington NATO summit held in July 2024, “seeks to fundamentally change the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security; the threat in all spheres that Russia poses to NATO will persist in the long term.” Western countries are gradually moving from words to deeds. Thus, in 2023, European companies sold almost $160 billion worth of arms, or 17% more than in 2022, and this trend is likely to continue for a long time.

Putin decided to start serial production of the Oreshnik cruise missile. It is known that the Oreshnik can only be produced at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, which also manufactures the Yars ICBM, the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the Iskander short-range missile. The capacity of this enterprise is limited, and increasing it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. According to data from Ukrainian intelligence (which can be believed or not, but we have no other information), the annual production of Oreshnik missiles could be 25 units. It is difficult to say when the Votkinsk plant will reach this level; it is only clear that this will not happen in the coming months. In other words, Putin is threatening the West with a missile that he does not have, and it is unknown when and in what quantity he will have it.

In Russia, the decision has only been made to start serial production of the Oreshnik, while the US already possesses medium-range weapons — the latest modification of the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Typhon ballistic missile (a ship-based SM-6 anti-aircraft missile adapted for ground launch against ground targets), capable of hitting enemy targets at ranges from 500 to 2,500 km with high accuracy. In addition, Europe is developing its own weapons for a similar purpose to achieve “strategic autonomy.” Russian politicians, political scientists, and propagandists, as a rule, forget about this when they threaten the West with a limited nuclear war.

Donald Trump’s victory turns into unfavorable consequences for Russia: it will have to end the war in Ukraine without achieving its main goal — the destruction of Ukrainian statehood; the assertion of “strategic autonomy” will accelerate in Europe; Iran is already looking for an opportunity to normalize relations with the USA, and so on. Moscow is reacting to this in its usual way: with nuclear threats. The US and European states, in turn, have allowed Putin a lot, but the threat of destroying Europe with nuclear weapons is unacceptable to them. And so, in the West, they may come, or perhaps have already come, to the conclusion: it is necessary to eliminate this threat.